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AND LEGAL HISTORY‘ 
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‗Legal anthropologists have well excavated the terrain of competing legalities. To date, however, 
legal pluralism has tended to focus on the exotic … or the pathological …. Only slowly is the 
historical pedigree of legal pluralism being rediscovered; only slowly is the age of the new being 
appreciated. So, in exploring legal pluralism as a so-called paradigm shift, one is not engaged in any 
polemical post-modern project; one is, rather, remembering as much as constructing.‘ 
 
- Roderick Macdonald, Metaphors of multiplicity: civil society, regimes and legal pluralism, 
in 15 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 69, 75-76 (1998) 
 
An interest in contemporary, comparative legal and normative hybridity—or ‗legal 
pluralism‘—around the globe has become increasingly common. But the hybridity of our 
own Western past, and the significance of this fact, is too often ignored. As part of a wider 
project on ‗hybridity and diffusion‘, the mixtures and movements of state law and other 
norms, this article contributes to the process of ‗remembering‘ this past. It does so to better 
prepare comparatists for the challenges of the present. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An interest in contemporary legal and normative hybridity or ‗legal pluralism‘ 
has become increasingly widespread in Western legal scholarship. This is 
sometimes driven by prescriptive ends, as part of a wider critique of the 
Western state. Among social scientists, this ‗ethos of pluralism‘ ‗is not only 
theoretical, but is also ethical and political.‘1 But this ‗ethos‘ also reflects 
significant practical changes in law across the globe, the fact that, ‗as a purely 
descriptive matter, hybridity cannot be wished away.‘2 Both within states and 
without, it is difficult to ignore the proliferation of laws and other norms over 
the course of the last half-century. It remains much less common, especially 
among comparativists, to acknowledge the legal and normative hybridity of 
the past. This is the consequence, in significant part, of the continuing 
acceptance across the West of ‗whiggish‘ national and pan-European 
narratives of legal development. But, as Roderick Macdonald noted a decade 
ago, ‗in exploring legal pluralism as a so-called paradigm shift, one is not 
engaged in any polemical post-modern project; one is, rather, remembering as 
much as constructing.‘3 Echoing this, the comparatist and social geographer 
Werner Menski has written that 
Recent comparative law scholarship indicates that maybe the Euro-centric 
perspective that privileged the state (lego-centrism) and territoriality 
(nationalist concerns) is not only quite parochial, but an idiom based on lost 
memory which does not lead towards a globally acceptable method of 
understanding law and its many pluralities, mixed manifestations, and 
commonalities.4  
                                           
1 M. Davies, The ethos of pluralism, in Sydney Law Review, 87 (27, 2005). Cf. S. Roberts, 
Against legal pluralism: some reflections on the contemporary enlargement of the legal domain, in Journal 
of Legal Pluralism, 95 (42, 1998) and After government?: on representing law without the state, in 
Modern Law Review, 1 (68, 2005). 
2 P.S. Berman, Global legal pluralism, in Southern California Law Review, 1155 (80, 2007). 
See Berman, The new legal pluralism, in Annual Review of Law and Social Science. 226 (5, 
2009). 
3 R. Macdonald, Metaphors of multiplicity: civil society, regimes and legal pluralism, in Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 76 (15, 1998). For a recent overview of 
legal pluralism, see A. Griffiths, Legal pluralism, in R. Banakar and M. Travers (eds), An 
introduction to law and social theory (2002). 
4 W. Menski, Beyond Europe, in E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds), Comparative law: a handbook, 
198 (2007). Menski cites William Twining‘s Globalisation and legal theory (2000) and Patrick 
Glenn‘s On common laws (2005). 
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This article contributes to the process of ‗remembering‘ this past and 
recapturing this ‗lost memory‘ to better prepare Western jurists to understand 
and address the pluralism of the present, not least within modern legal 
traditions designated as ‗mixed legal systems‘. 
The paper begins with a brief survey of ‗legal pluralism‘ as the term is used by 
social scientists, comparatists, and legal historians. It reviews, all too quickly, 
legal hybridity from the twelfth to the nineteenth century. It is a reminder that 
legal and normative hybridity is the rule; unified, national state law is the 
exception. As Patrick Glenn, the jurist who perhaps best combines the roles 
of comparatist and legal historian, has put it, both in Western history and 
around the contemporary world, ‗law … precedes the State and continues to 
surround it.‘5 This article also suggests that appreciating this fact allows us to 
better contextualize contemporary ‗mixed legal systems‘ and that ‗mixed 
jurists‘ are particularly well-placed to pursue research on hybridity, past and 
present and around the globe. Finally, this article is part of a wider project on 
‗hybridity and diffusion‘.6 That project aims to contribute to the study of legal 
and normative mixtures and movements and to encourage interdisciplinary 
dialogue between jurists and others (especially anthropologists, geographers, 
historians, philosophers, sociologists, etc).7 
II. THE ETHOS OF PLURALISM 
Neither the ‗ethos‘ nor the fact of pluralism is new. Almost a century ago, 
Eugen Ehrlich stressed the importance of the ‗living law‘ of society. This 
dominates life itself even though it has not been posited in legal propositions. 
The source of our knowledge of this law is, first, the modern legal document; 
secondly, direct observation of life, of commerce, of customs and usages, and 
of all associations, not only those that the law has recognised but also of those 
                                           
5 P. Glenn, Persuasive authority, in McGill Law Journal/Revue de Droit de McGill, 289 (32 
1987).  
6 Note the suggestion, by cultural historian Peter Burke, that ‗hybridity … is a slippery, 
ambiguous term, at once literal and metaphorical, descriptive and explanatory.‘ Cultural 
hybridity, 54 (2009). Cf J Holbrook, Legal hybridity in the Philippines: lessons in legal pluralism from 
Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, in Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law, 1, 
3 n8 (18, 2010). 
7 See Juris Diversitas at www.jurisdiversitas.blogsot.com (last visited 30 November 2010) for 
additional information. 
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that it has overlooked and passed by, indeed even of those that it has 
disapproved.8 
Modern hybridity reflects the complexity of contemporary law and legal 
systems at the global, national, and sub-national levels. The study of hybridity  
is especially pronounced at the boundaries between the legal and social 
sciences. Anthropologists and sociologists, in particular, have noted the 
frequently fuzzy divisions between (i) state or ‗official‘ laws and (ii) other non-
state social norms or ‗unofficial‘ laws.9 The coexistence of both is, it is argued, 
‗the omnipresent, normal situation in human society‘.10 Social scientists and 
their allies in the legal academy have provided very sophisticated analyses, 
often rooted in empirical study, of the relationship of both ‗laws‘. These are 
‗semi-autonomous social field[s]‘ that have ‗rule-making capacities, and the 
means to induce or coerce compliance; but [are] simultaneously set in a larger 
social matrix which can, and does, affect and invade it‘.11 If this broad 
understanding of ‗legal‘ pluralism has sometimes dismayed jurists, dissuading 
them from engagement, it has arguably been ‗a useful sensitising and analytical 
tool‘ in contemporary analysis.12 More recently, it has been suggested that 
‗normative pluralism‘ better captures this idea.13 In this analysis, the 
uniqueness of the law of the state is recognised at the same time that that it is 
set within wider patterns of normative ordering. Normative pluralism is 
                                           
8 E. Ehrlich, Fundamental principles of the sociology of law, 493 (2002 [1936]), tr. W.L. Moll. The 
original German edition was published in 1913. Ehrlich argued that ‗[a]t the present as well 
as at any other time, the center of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor in 
juristic science, nor in juridical decision, but in society itself.' Ibid., ‗Foreword‘. 
9 M. Chiba, Other phases of legal pluralism in the contemporary world, in Ratio Juris, 228 (11, 1998). 
See Chiba‘s ‗three dichotomies of law under the identity postulate of a legal culture‘ 
(‗official law‘/‘unofficial law‘, ‗indigenous law‘/‘transplanted law‘, ‗legal rules‘/‘legal 
postulates‘) and the ‗identity postulate of a legal culture‘. Ibid., 240-2. 
10 J. Griffiths, What is legal pluralism, in Journal of Legal Pluralism, 39 (24, 1986). 
11 S.F. Moore, Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study, 
in Law & Society Review, 54, 56 (7, 1973).  
12 F. von Benda-Beckmann, Who‘s afraid of legal pluralism?, in Journal of Legal Pluralism, 40 
(47, 2002). 
13 J. Griffiths, The idea of sociology of law and its relation to law and society, in M. Freeman (ed), 
Law and sociology: current legal issues – volume 8, 63-4 (2005). Cf B. Dupret, Legal pluralism, 
normative plurality, and the Arab world in Dupret, M. Berger, and L. al-Zwaini (eds), Legal 
pluralism in the Arab world (1999) and W. Twining, Globalisation and legal theory, especially 82-8 
(2000). 
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simply a social fact with which jurists must contend.14 This includes, as David 
Nelken has usefully written, ‗law beyond the law‘, ‗law without the state‘, and 
‗order without law‘.15  
Scholarship on legal or normative hybridity has gradually expanded in the last 
few decades. The same is true of an ever-expanding catalogue of ‗pluralist‘ 
terminology. The first wave of social science research, the so-called ‗classical 
legal pluralism‘, focused on non-Western, post-colonial communities. It often 
served as a critique of Western colonialism. An important distinction is also 
made between ‗state legal pluralism‘ in which plural legal orders are a part of 
the wider state systems and ‗deep legal pluralism‘ in which the focus in on both 
state laws and non-state norms.16 More recently, research in ‗new legal 
pluralism‘ has included case studies within the West, suggesting the continuing 
importance of non-state norms here.17 This has sometimes been linked to 
research on ‗social norms‘ linked both to political science and to law and 
economics.18 These works have suggested, that ‗[i]n most contexts, law is not 
central to the maintenance of social order‘.19 And, while the ‗specifics are not 
yet clear‘, one element of a third pluralist paradigm—after ‗classical‘ and ‗new‘ 
legal pluralism—is ‗global legal pluralism‘.20 This encompasses international 
law, human rights, and, more problematically, involves the assertion of an 
increasingly important commercial law or lex mercatoria created by non-state 
actors.21 
Especially among the advocates of ‗global legal pluralism‘, the study of legal 
and normative hybridity extends beyond empirical social science research to 
more critical analyses. These are often linked to debates on the character of 
                                           
14 On a ‗Social Fact Conception of Legal Pluralism‘, see W. Twining, Normative and legal 
pluralism: a global perspective, in Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, 488-9 (20, 
2010). 
15 D. Nelken, Eugen Ehrlich, living law, and plural legalities, in Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 443 
(9 2008). 
16 G. Woodman, The idea of legal pluralism in Dupret, Berger, and al-Zwaini, Legal pluralism in 
the Arab world, 5. These may also be characterised as ‗weak‘ and ‗strong‘ legal pluralism. See 
also M.B. Hooker, Legal pluralism: an introduction to colonial and neo-colonial law (1975). 
17 S.E. Merry, Legal pluralism, in Law & Society Review, 872 ff. (22 1988).  
18 W.K. Jones, A theory of social norms, in University of Illinois Law Review, 545 (1994). 
19 R. Ellickson, Order without law: how neighbours settle disputes, 280 (1991). 
20 R. Michaels, Global legal pluralism, in Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 243 (5, 
2009). 
21 C. Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex mercatoria: hoist with its own petard?, in Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 67 (5, 2004).  
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‗globalisation‘.22 Gunther Teubner defines legal pluralism ‗as a multiplicity of 
diverse communicative processes in a given social field that observe social 
action under the binary code of legal/illegal.‘23 Intentionally blurring the lines 
between law and other norms, Boaventura de Sousa Santos has written that  
We live in a time of porous legality or of legal porosity, multiple networks of 
legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespassing. Our legal life is 
constituted by an intersection of different legal orders, that is, by interlegality. 
Interlegality is the phenomenological counterpart of legal plurality, and a key 
concept in an oppositional postmodern conception of law.24 
For de Sousa Santos, the recognition of ‗interlegality‘ is not merely descriptive, 
but a prescriptive element in a critical and emancipatory jurisprudence. And, 
in parallel to Jacques Vanderlinden, Macdonald has made an eloquent case for 
a ‗critical legal pluralism‘. In this approach, rather than ‗reify[ing] ―norm-
generating communities‖ as surrogates for the State‘, as the social sciences do, 
a ‗critical legal pluralism‘ focuses upon the role of individuals in ‗generating 
normativity.‘25 In this approach, law is not limited to legislation or legislators 
or even to communities and customs. Instead, individuals are themselves law 
makers.26 
Alongside these developments has come a critique of state- and state law-
centred analytical models. Much of the empirical social science scholarship 
was intentionally ‗destructive‘, targeting legal monism, centralism, and 
positivism.27 John Griffiths wrote, for example, of an ‗ideology of legal 
                                           
22 For the importance of geography to legal pluralism, see F. von Benda-Beckmann, K. von 
Benda-Beckmann, and A. Griffiths, Space and legal pluralism: an introduction, in von Benda-
Beckmann, von Benda-Beckmann, and Griffiths (eds), Spatilizing law: an anthropological 
geography of law in society (2009). 
23 G. Teubner, Global Bukowina: legal pluralism in the world society in G. Teubner (ed), Global law 
without a state, 10 (1996). See Teubner, The two faces of Janus: rethinking legal pluralism, in 
Cardozo Law Review, 1443 (13, 1991-92). 
24 B. de Sousa Santos, Towards a new legal common sense: law, globalization, and emancipation, 437 
(2nd ed. 2002). 
25 M.-M. Kleinhans and R. Macdonald, What is a critical legal pluralism, in  Canadian Journal 
of Law and Society, 25, 35, 38 (12, 1997). See also Macdonald, Unitary law re-form, pluralistic 
law re-substance: illuminating legal change, in Louisiana Law Review, 1113 (67, 2007).  
26 See J. Vanderlinden, Return to legal pluralism: twenty years later, in Journal of Legal Pluralism, 
149, 151-2 (26, 1989). Cf R. Cover‘s wok on ‗jurisgenesis‘. Nomos and narrative, in Harvard 
Law Review, 4 (97, 1983). 
27 Macdonald and D. Sandomiershi extend this critique to ‗prescriptivism‘, ie ‗the belief that 
law is a social fact existing outside and apart from those whose conduct it claims to 
 
Seán Patrick Donlan 
‗Remembering: Legal Hybridity and Legal History‘ 
 
7 
centralism, law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, 
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state 
institutions.‘28 This critique has too often been ignored. Recently, however, a 
number of jurisprudes have recognised the value, or necessity, of 
incorporating multiple sources of legal and normative authority into their 
analysis. Most notably, William Twining has stressed the importance of 
moving beyond Euro-centric and state-centred legal theory in an age of 
globalisation.29 In demanding a less parochial ‗general jurisprudence‘ he noted 
that 
A reasonably inclusive cosmopolitan discipline of law needs to encompass all 
levels of relations and of ordering, relations between these levels, and all 
important forms of law including supra-state (eg international, regional) and 
non-state law (eg religious, transnational law, chthonic law, ie 
tradition/custom) and various forms of ‗soft law‘30 
This acknowledgement ‗that normative and legal orders can co-exist in the 
same time-space context‘, he notes, ‗greatly complicates the tasks of 
comparative law.‘31 Brian Tamanaha has made a similar argument both with 
respect to jurisprudence and comparative law.32 He is keen to stress the 
diverse instantiation of law, both historically and (more often in his work) 
comparatively.33 For both Twining and Tamanaha, state law is but one 
manifestation of law and the study of legal theory is closely linked to 
comparative law and socio-legal studies. 34  
                                                                                                                           
regulate‘. R.A. Macdonald and D. Sandomiershi, Against monopolies, in Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly, 610, 615 (57, 2006). 
28 A. Griffiths, What is legal pluralism, 39. 
29 See D.B. Goldman, Globalisation and the Western legal tradition: recurring patterns of law and 
authority (2007). 
30 W. Twining, Globalisation and comparative law, in E. Örücü and D. Nelken, Comparative law, 
71 (2007). See generally W. Twining, General jurisprudence: understanding law from a global 
perspective (2009).  
31 W. Twining, Globalisation and comparative law in E. Örücü and D. Nelken, Comparative law, 
71. 
32 B.Z. Tamanaha, A general jurisprudence of law and society (2001). See also B.Z. Tamanaha, 
Understanding legal pluralism: past to present, local to global, in Sydney Law Review, 375 (30, 
2008). 
33 It may be important, or at least interesting, to note that Twining was born, raised, and 
taught for some time in Africa; Tamanaha is a native of Hawaii and practiced law there and 
in Miconesia. 
34 Tamanaha is critical of some approaches to legal pluralism. See B.Z. Tamanaha, A non-
essentialist version of legal pluralism, in  Journal of Law & Society, 296 (27, 2000). See also B. 
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While all of this research would appear to be at least useful, if not essential, to 
comparative law, it has not yet received the attention it deserves.35 One aspect 
of this is merely terminological. Confusingly, both comparatists and legal 
historians typically use ‗legal pluralism‘ in a much more limited manner than 
their counterparts in the social sciences. The former generally use the phrase 
to refer to the ‗plurality of laws‘, those traditions generally recognised as laws 
by lawyers without necessarily including non-state or unofficial norms.36 These 
traditions are distinguished from custom or other normative orders by their 
level of formality and institutionalisation, including, over time, the state itself. 
It is a distinction between legal and normative hybridity. This terminological 
difference can sometimes mask the fascination of comparative lawyers, 
verging at times on obsession, with taxonomy. The classifications serve a 
purpose, of course, if only in short-handing the complexities of mixity by 
creating useful ideal types for comparative teaching, scholarship, and dialogue. 
Taken too seriously, however, they suggest closed and harmonious legal 
systems and traditions rather than more complex ‗amalgam[s] of solutions to 
problems faced in the past.‘37 Acknowledging a far more subtle and complex 
legal hybridity creates problems for any neat division of legal traditions into 
discrete legal families; the incorporation of normative hybridity into 
comparative analysis is still more difficult.38 It may, however, be necessary to 
understand the complex normative orderings of past and present. 
                                                                                                                           
Dupret, Legal pluralism, plurality of laws, and legal practices: theories, critiques, and praxiological re-
specification, in European Journal of Legal Studies (1, 2007) (available at 
http://www.ejls.eu/1/14UK.pdf (last visited 30 November 2010)).  
35 But cf. T.W. Bennett, Legal anthropology and comparative law: a disciplinary compromise, in 
Stellenbosch Law Review, 4 (21, 2010). 
36 This is similar to ‗state legal pluralism‘, though with the rather significant qualification 
that the state has not always been involved, as institutionalised normative orders preceded 
the state.  
37 J. Gordley, Comparative law and legal history, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann (eds), The 
Oxford handbook of comparative law, 762 (2006). The best-known classifications remain those 
of R. David, Major legal systems of the world today (3rd ed. 1985) and K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, 
An introduction to comparative and European Law (3rd ed. 1998). 
38 J. Husa, Legal families, in J. Smits, Elgar encyclopedia of comparative law (2006). Cf. U. Mattei, 
Three patterns of law: taxonomy and change in the world‘s legal systems, in American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 5 (45, 1997). 
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There are some exceptions to this narrow disciplinary focus and the ‗lost 
memory‘ of past legal and normative hybridity.39 Menski, for example, has 
explicitly placed law in a plural and global context. He has written that ‗it is 
evident that a narrow approach to law as state law leads neither to appropriate 
understanding of non-European societies and cultures nor to satisfactory 
analysis of the phenomenon of law even in its European manifestations.‘40 A 
decade ago, Nora Demleitner wrote that 
 
[a]t bottom, all legal systems are mixed—derived from imported structures, 
concepts and ideas but also emanating from different normative systems 
which are based on customs, religions and languages, habitat and natural 
resources, families, geography and climate, conceptions of morality, and other 
features.41 
 
Other comparatists, especially mixed jurists, have also made explicit the fact 
that all legal traditions are mixed or impure.42 It has even been suggested that 
legal pluralism is contributing to a ‗new rapproachement‘ between 
comparatists and socio-legal jurists.43 It ‗provided an early point of dialogue … 
because it made room for each of their respective areas of expertise: both 
state law and customary law deserved exploration.‘44 If this is a somewhat 
optimistic appraisal of the current state of comparative law, it points to 
exciting possibilities. It may be too much to ask that comparatists grasp both 
                                           
39 W.F. Menski, Beyond Europe, in E. Örücü and D. Nelken, Comparative law, 198 (2007). See 
also U. Mattei, T. Ruskola, and A. Gidi (eds), Schlesinger‘s comparative law: cases - texts - materials 
(7th ed. 2009). 
40 W.F. Menski, Comparative law in a global context: the legal systems of Asia and Africa, 185-86 
(2nd ed. 2006). He has explicitly linked this to legal theory in Ibid., chapter three. See also 
E. Örücü, Developing comparative law, in E. Örücü and D. Nelken, Comparative law, 61. 
41 N.V. Demleitner, Combating legal ethnocentrism: comparative law sets boundaries, in Arizona State 
Law Journal, 737, 748-9 (31, 1999). ‗In the future, mixed legal systems will become ever 
more important and predominant‘. Ibid., 749. 
42 E. Örücü, A general view of ―legal families‖ and of ―mixing systems‖ in E. Örücü and D. Nelken, 
Comparative law, 177 (2007). See also V. Palmer, Mixed legal systems … and the myth of pure laws, 
in Louisiana Law Review, 1205 (67, 2006-7). 
43 A. Riles, Comparative law and socio-legal studies, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, The 
Oxford handbook of comparative law, 777 (2006). See also R. Cotterrell, Comparatists and sociology, 
in P. Legrand and R. Munday (eds), Comparative legal studies: traditions and transitions, 134 
(2003). For an earlier attempt see J. Hall, Comparative law and social theory (1963).  
44 A. Riles, ‗Comparative law and socio-legal studies‘ in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, 
The Oxford handbook of comparative law, 805-6 (2006).  
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(i) the theoretical work of jurisprudes and both empirical and critical legal 
pluralists and (ii) the detailed case studies of legal historians, social sciences, 
and others. But a genuine rapproachment might make possible 
interdisciplinary studies that successfully combine theoretical breath and 
practical detail to produce new insights and information on legal and 
normative hybridity.45 The same may be said of the diffusion of laws in 
European history and in the process of transplanting European law around 
the world. ‗Scholars who study the one could learn from those who study the 
other, and vice versa.‘46 
Legal and normative hybridity is, in fact, closely linked to the ‗diffusion‘ of 
laws and norms. Indeed, ‗[l]aws, like people, migrate. Legal borders, like 
physical ones, are permeable, and seepage is everywhere.‘47 Comparatists have, 
of course, frequently acknowledged the role of ‗transplants‘ and ‗receptions‘ of 
law, though not without debate.48 Alan Watson‘s ‗transplant‘ thesis is 
especially important and influential.49 The Scot‘s focus has been, for several 
decades, to suggest that the transplantation of discrete legal ideas and 
institutions is extremely common.50 This has displeased those who want to 
                                           
45 Scholarship on comparative law and legal culture is especially promising. See R. 
Cotterrell, Comparative law and legal culture, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, The Oxford 
handbook of comparative law (2006); D. Nelken, Using the concept of legal culture, in Australian 
Journal of Legal Philosophy, 1 (29, 2004); M. Van Hoecke and M. Warrington, Legal 
cultures, legal paradigms and legal doctrine: towards a new model for comparative law, in International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 495 (47, 1998).  
46 D. Heirbaut, Europe and the people without legal history: on the need for a general history of non-
European law, in Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiendenis, 269, 277 (68, 2008). See also G. 
Frankenberg, Critical comparisons: re-thinking comparative law, in Harvard International Law 
Journal, 411 (26, 1985). 
47 J. Resnik, Foreign as domestic affairs: rethinking horizontal federalism and foreign affairs pre-emption 
in light of translocal internationalism, in Emory Law Journal, 31, 63-4 (57, 2008). 
48 In addition to the few jurists mentioned here, see R. Cotterrell, Is there a logic of legal 
transplants, in D. Nelken and J Feest (eds), Adapting legal cultures (2001); D. Nelken, Beyond the 
metaphor of legal transplants? some consequences of autopoiesis theory for the study of cross cultural legal 
adaptation, in J. Priban and D. Nelken (eds), The Consequences of Autopoeisis (2001); D. Nelken, 
Legal transplants and beyond: of disciplines and metaphors, in A Harding and E. Örücü, Comparative 
law in the 21st Century (2002). 
49 A. Watson, Legal transplants: an approach to comparative law (2nd ed. 1993) and Legal transplants again (2000). See 
also J.M. Miller, A typology of legal transplants: using sociology, legal history and Argentine examples to explain the 
transplant process, in  American Journal of Comparative Law, 839 (51, 2003).  
50 This is inevitably a question of history and Watson has also been a strong advocate of 
comparative legal history. See A. Watson, Legal history and a common law for Europe (2001) and 
Legal cultures v legal traditions, in M. van Hoecke, Epistemology and methodology in comparative law 
(2004). 
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insist on particularly close, arguably romantic, connections between law and 
culture.51 The idea of ‗receptions‘ of law is less contentious, at least for the 
specific receptions most often discussed.52 The importance of the ius commune 
especially can be exaggerated. It cannot be denied. These concepts are so 
important to modern comparative analysis that Michele Graziadei has even 
suggested comparative law can be characterised as the ‗study of legal 
transplants and receptions‘.53 Similarly, Pierguiseppe Monateri has suggested 
the (unfortunately pejorative) term ‗contaminations‘ to capture this idea.54 
Teubner has spoken of ‗irritants‘.55 Esin Örücü has offered a number of ways 
in which to characterise the movement of laws, including the ‗transfrontier 
mobility of law‘.56 Consistent with scholarship in the social sciences, Twining 
uses ‗diffusion‘.57 He has noted that 
There are many other concepts, hypotheses and models to be found in the 
much more developed social science literature on diffusion that might be 
                                           
51 Cf. P. Legrand, The impossibility of legal transplants, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 
111 (4, 1997) and European legal systems are not converging, in International and Comparative Legal Quarterly, 52 
(45, 1996). Watson‘s ‗greatest complaint with … Legrand is that he neglects comparative legal history.‘ A. 
Watson, Legal transplants and European private law, in J. Smits (ed), The contribution of mixed legal systems to European 
private law, 18 (2001). See also J.Q. Whitman, The new-Romantic turn, in P. Legrand and R. Munday, Comparative 
legal studies (2003). 
52 A. Watson, Aspects of reception of law, in American Journal of Comparative Law, 345 (44, 
1996). See also A. Kocourek, Factors in the reception of law, in Tulane Law Review, 209 (10, 
1935-36). 
53 Comparative law as the study of transplants and receptions, in M. Reimann and R. Zimmermann, 
The Oxford handbook of comparative law.  
54 P.G. Monateri, The ―weak‖ law: contaminations and legal cultures‘, in Italian national reports to 
the XVth International Congress of Comparative Law Bristol 1998, 107 (1998).  
55 G. Teubner, Legal irritants: good faith in British law or how unifying law ends up in new divergences, 
in Modern Law Review, 11 (61, 1998). 
56 She has also spoken of ‗law as transposition‘, the ‗tree model‘, and the ‗wave theory‘, the 
last two both borrowed from linguistics. See ‗A theoretical framework for transfrontier 
mobility of law‘ in R. Jagtenberg, Örücü, and A.J. de Roo, Transfrontier mobility of law (1995) 
and E. Örücü, Law as transposition, in  International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 205 
(51, 2002).  
57 W. Twining, Diffusion and globalization discourse, in Harvard International Law Journal, 507, 
512 (47, 2006). In fact, his use of the term effectively envelopes the study of both (i) legal 
and normative hybridity and (ii) legal culture. See W. Twining, Globalisation and comparative 
law, in E. Örücü and D. Nelken, Comparative law; Diffusion of law: a global perspective , in Journal 
of Legal Pluralism, 1 (49, 2004); Social science and diffusion of law, in  Journal of Law and 
Sociology, 203 (32, 2005).  
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usefully transplanted, imitated, adapted or plagiarized for the modest purposes 
of legal scholarship and socio-legal studies.58 
This is true and again suggests the benefits of greater interdisciplinary 
dialogue. Legal diffusion, whether in piecemeal transplants or wider 
receptions, is the counterpart and creator of legal hybridity. The mixtures and 
movements of law are very closely connected. 
III. HYBRIDITY AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Legal historians are increasingly adept at research on legal, if not necessarily 
normative, hybridity.59 But there remain important limitations. These include 
the wider and comparative picture of historical hybridity (rather than narrow 
case studies of individual jurisdictions) and the relatively limited dialogue and 
engagement between legal historians and comparatists.60 The creation of 
genuinely common or general national laws, a legal ‗system‘ centred on the 
state, and the elimination of competing jurisdictions was a very long historical 
process throughout the West.61 Both legal and normative hybridity was the 
norm before the nineteenth century. There were multiple—often 
transnational or rather, pre-national and trans-territorial—contemporaneous 
legal orders co-existing in the same geographical space and at the same time, 
though often affecting different individuals.  For much of our history, law was 
                                           
58 W. Twining, Diffusion and globalization discourse, quoted, 513. 
59 American legal historians have been particularly good at this. See C. Tomlins, The many 
legalities of colonialization: a manifesto of destiny for early American legal history, in Tomlins and B.H. 
Mann (eds), The many legalities of early America (2001). See also S. Hadden, New directions in the 
study of legal cultures, in Cambrian Law Review, 1 (33, 2002). 
60 S. Donlan, Histories of hybridity: a problem, a primer, a plea, and a plan (of sorts), in E. Cashin-
Ritaine, S. Donlan, and M. Sychold (eds), Hybrid legal traditions and comparative law (2010). On 
interdisciplinarity, see also J. Rose, English legal history and interdisciplinary studies, in A. 
Musson, Boundaries of the law: geography, gender and jurisdiction in medieval and early modern Europe 
(2005). 
61 On European legal history generally, see O.F. Robinson, T.D. Fergus, and W.M. 
Gordon, European legal history (3rd ed. 2001) and R. Lesaffer, European legal history: a cultural 
and political perspective (2009). See also J.H. Baker, An introduction to English legal history (4th ed. 
2002); P. Brand, The making of the common law (2003); P. Stein, Roman law in European legal 
history (1999); R.C. van Caenegem, The birth of the English common law (2nd ed. 1988); R.C. van 
Caenegem, An historical introduction to private law (1992); T.G. Watkin, An historical introduction 
to the civil law (1999); A. Watson, The making of the civil law (1981); F. Wieacker, A history of 
private law in Europe with particular reference to Germany (1995 [1967]), tr. T. Weir. 
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multi- or poly-centric, with multiple, competing centres.62 This fragmented 
plurality of laws blurred seamlessly into the less formally institutionalised, but 
meaningful, normative pluralism from which more formal laws often emerged 
and with which they would continue to compete. 63 Especially in the period 
before modern nationalism and positivism, legal monism or centralisation, 
such normative traditions may appropriately be included within the public or 
popular juridical sphere.64 The boundaries between these formal and informal 
legalities were especially porous. As Rodolfo Sacco has written, ‗the 
―Lawgiver‖ is a recent entry into the domain of Law and … law may live, and 
lived, even without a lawgiver.‘65 
All legal traditions or systems were—and indeed are—hybrids created in 
significant part by the diffusion of laws. As HD Hazeltine wrote, somewhat 
colourfully, eighty years ago: 
Law is continually moving, changing, in response to the pressure of the forces 
that arise in the inner life of the community or that penetrate from outside; 
and one of the most important of these external forces is the introduction of 
foreign legal influence. Whenever a body of law comes into contact with other 
systems, it ceases to preserve its native character intact; it takes on new 
colours of form and content derived from foreign law. In all of the periods of 
legal history, from early antiquity to the present day, the play of these foreign 
influences and counter-influences has produced systems of mixed origin; and 
it would seem, indeed, that no system of civilised law known to history has 
ever been strictly pure, in the sense of being based solely on indigenous 
growths.66 
Modern national legal traditions in the West are each unique mixtures broadly 
borrowing from the multifarious folk-laws of the past, the romano-canonical 
                                           
62 See L. Benton, Law and colonial cultures: legal regimes in world history, 1400-1900 (2002), 11. Cf 
H. Petersen and H Zahle, Legal polycentricity: consequences of pluralism in law (1995) and A. 
Hirovonen (ed), Polycentricity: the multiple scenes of law (1998). 
63 P. Stein, Legal institutions: the development of dispute settlement (1984). 
64 D. Millon, Positivism in the historiography of the common law, in Wisconsin Law Review 669 
(1989) and J. Rose, Doctrinal development: legal history, law, and legal theory, in Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, 323 (22, 2002). 
65 R. Sacco, Mute law, in  American Journal of Comparative Law, 455, 456 (43, 1995). See 
also R. Sacco, Legal formants: a dynamic approach to comparative law (installment I of II), in  
American Journal of Comparative Law, 1 (39, 1991) and Legal formants: a dynamic approach to 
comparative law (installment II of II), in  American Journal of Comparative Law, 343 (39, 1991). 
66 H.D. Hazeltine, The study of comparative legal history, in Journal of the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law, 27, 33 (1927). 
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‗learned laws‘ or ius commune, and other trans-territorial iura communia (including 
feudal law and lex mercatoria). Over time, these various laws were linked to 
public institutions coupled with increasingly meaningful and centralised 
powers of enforcement. This was, however, a very long process. The laws 
only slowly came under the control of early modern states and were, 
subsequently, unified with the creation, especially from the nineteenth 
century, of modern Western states and legal systems, and dominant common 
national laws. Indeed, the various local and particular iura propria, the 
discretionary jurisdictions of ‗low‘ justice, and other normative, non-legal 
orders arguably affected more people more of the time than did Europe‘s 
state laws. These jurisdictions, both official and unofficial, contributed much 
to the substance and survival of the latter. Their authoritativeness did not rest 
on political authority. 
Over two decades ago, Norbert Rouland wrote that ‗[a]t present, it requires a 
measure of intellectual laziness to believe in the monistic legal myth …‘.67 
Such intellectual laziness is, however, all too common. Historical hybridity is 
too infrequently taken seriously by many Western jurists. With the exception 
perhaps of ‗mixed jurists‘ working within or on explicitly ‗mixed legal 
systems‘, this seems to be especially true in the Anglophonic legal world.68 The 
fact of hybridity has been obscured by the comparative independence of 
Anglo-American law from European iura communia and a more general belief 
in Anglo-exceptionalism. English law was, in fact, always part of a wider 
European jurisprudential-juridical legal culture.69 This blindness to the 
pluralism of the past obscures our understanding of the pluralism, both 
Western and global, of the present. What follows is painted in very broad 
brushstrokes, occasionally discussing Anglo-American law in greater detail. It 
is also largely concerned with legal, rather than normative, hybridity. That the 
latter is mentioned only in passing reflects the state of current research and 
                                           
67 N. Rouland, Legal anthropology (1994 [1988]), tr. P.G Planel, 46. 
68 ‗However mixed his system is in fact the English lawyer does not think of it as such.‘ J. 
McKnight, Some historical observations on mixed systems of law, in Juridical Review (n.s.), 177, 178 
(22, 1977).  
69 S. Donlan, ―All this together make up our Common Law‖: legal hybridity in England and Ireland, 
1704-1804, in E. Örücü (ed), Mixed legal systems at new frontiers (2010). This article grew out 
of S. Donlan, ―Our laws are as mixed as our language: commentaries on the laws of England and 
Ireland, 1704-1804, in Journal of Comparative Law, 178 (3, 2008) (also available as 12 
Electronic Journal of Comparative law (2008) at www.ecjl.org/121/abs121-6.html (last 
visited 30 November 2010)). See both articles for additional footnotes discussing the links 
between Anglo-American and continental law. 
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the historiographical difficulties involved in the study of non-state normative 
orders. But this wider hybridity, the study of formal and informal legalities, is 
vital as both source and context of ever-widening official law. Indeed, the 
pluralist perspective requires a shift away from an essentialist definition of law 
to an historical understanding since any situation of legal pluralism develops 
over time through the dialectic between legal systems, each of which both 
constitutes and reconstitutes the other in some way. Defining the essence of 
law or custom is less valuable than situating these concepts in particular sets 
of relations between particular legal orders in particular historical contexts.70 
To be clear, the social sciences cannot simply serve as a substitute for careful 
historiography, whether narrowly ‗internal‘ to legal ideas and institutions or 
setting law in a wider ‗external‘ context.71 But treated with an appreciation for 
their different strengths and weaknesses, anthropological and sociological 
models have proven useful and point to the utility of dialogue beyond the 
boundaries of legal science.72 
IV. LEGAL HYBRIDITY IN HISTORY 
The long period between Roman ruin and subsequent legal revival saw a great 
many local, largely unwritten, folk-laws across Europe.73 These varied 
considerably, but emphasised a customary origin to popular traditions. Law 
was not seen as made in legislation or adjudication, but was instead 
declaratory of customary practices. In fact, the resulting law was, at least over 
time, far from the actual lived customs and practices of the community at 
large. They are better seen as ‗legal customs‘ than ‗customary law‘.74 Especially 
through the process of redaction, it was brought under the interpretive 
                                           
70 Legal pluralism, 889. On similar comments on ‗[h]istorical and comparative study‘, see also 
M. Galanter, Justice in many rooms: courts, private ordering, and indigenous law, in Journal of Legal 
Pluralism, 1, 28 (19, 1981). 
71 D.L. Donham, Thinking temporally or modernizing anthropology, in American Anthropologist, 
134 (103, 2001). 
72 See, eg, J. Bossy (ed), Disputes and settlements: law and human relations in the West (1983) and 
T. Kuehn, Law, family, and women: towards a legal anthropology of renaissance Italy (1991). For a 
use of literary sources, see P. Hyams, Norms and legal argument before 1150, in A. Lewis and 
M. Lobban (eds), Law and history: current legal issues – volume 6 (2004). 
73 What follows is only a broad survey and citations are comparatively limited. 
74 D. Heirbaut, An unknown treasure for historians of early medieval Europe: the debate of German 
legal historians on the nature of medieval law, in Rechtsgeschichte, 1 (27, 2010). 
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control of literate and legal elites: jurists, judges, and legislators.75 Their 
interpretation, rather than popular opinion, determined its justiciable contours 
and often moved it far from its origins.76 Genuine custom and its norms never 
disappeared, of course, and ‗in the interstices of the society, customary 
practises continued to hold their appeal‘.77 Folk-laws were subsequently 
supplemented by ‗vulgar‘ Roman laws redacted by the ‗Germanic‘ tribes that 
succeeded Rome, the Romanised laws of the church, and feudal law. As 
Roman political administration had atrophied, the church provided an 
important link, both institutionally and intellectually, with the classical past 
and the Latin language. Into the modern period, its responsibilities extended 
into secular or non-theological matters, including Romano-canonical 
procedures. Canon law was an essential to medieval law and, as a 
consequence, to that of today.78 The legal aspects of feudalism, too, served as 
an important common source for law throughout Europe.79 This was not 
merely substantive, but linked to jurisdiction, the ability to speak or declare 
the law authoritatively. More generally, but no less importantly, modern 
constitutional thought owes much to the legal and political division of powers 
inherent in medieval hybridity.80 
These were pan-European developments, part of a wider Western legal 
tradition.81 Britain and Ireland were not unaffected. England weathered 
invasion and settlement by, in turn, the Romans, the Anglo-Saxons, and 
Norseman. As a result of the latter two, England created a monarchy more 
centralized and effective than its continental contemporaries. With the 
eleventh-century arrival of the Normans, this was married to considerable 
administrative efficiency. If Norman folk-law was not significantly different 
from England‘s, they brought a more mature feudalism and established 
                                           
75 D. Kelley, ―Second nature‖: the idea of custom in European law, society, and culture, in A. Grafton 
and A. Blair (eds), The transmission of culture in early modern Europe (1990). See also Glenn, The 
capture, reconstruction and marginalization of ―custom‖, in  American Journal of Comparative Law, 
613 (45, 1997). 
76 A. Cromartie, The idea of common law as custom, in A. Perreau-Saussine and J.B. Murphy 
(eds), The nature of customary law: legal, historical and philosophical perspectives, 203 (2007). 
77 L. Sheleff, The future of tradition: customary law, common law and legal pluralism, 5 (1999). 
78 J. Brundage, Medieval canon law (1995). 
79 D. Heirbaut, Feudal law: the real ius commune of property in Europe, or: should we reintroduce 
duplex dominium?, in  European Review of Private Law, 321 (3, 2003).  
80 R.C. Van Caenegem, An historical introduction to Western constitutional law (1995).  
81 H.J. Berman, Law and revolution [I]: the formation of the Western legal tradition (1983). See also 
F. Wieacker, Foundations of European legal culture, in American Journal of Comparative Law, 1 
(38, 1990).  
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ecclesiastical courts on a continental model. The resulting ‗―English‖ law 
owed much to its own folk-law, broadly similar to that of the continent, and 
continental feudal law.82 England‘s royal courts would create, over the course 
of centuries, a law geographically common across the English kingdom. But 
the English ‗common law‘ as it developed competed with pan-European 
common laws, other English common laws (eg, Equity), and numerous local, 
particular jurisdictions.83 These jurisdictions spoke not only in English, but in 
Law French and Latin as well.84 The effectiveness of the royal courts as a 
forum for adjudication, its greater guarantee of enforcement, and later 
political developments, would eventually allow it to dominate England‘s other 
laws. It was ‗not the sole source of English law, though in the long run it 
turned out to be its principal unifying factor.‘85 This eventual hegemony 
resulted, in large part, by borrowing from or absorbing its rivals, foreign and 
domestic, in a pattern that was mirrored on the continent.  And if it drew on 
local customs, as elsewhere across Europe, it ‗was not a popular but a 
professional custom‘.86 
Contemporaneous with the beginnings of the English common law was the 
emergence of a European ius commune in the revived, revised, and subsequently 
received ‗law‘ of Justinian‘s Digest. A casuistic collage of doctrine, its 
rediscovery in the twelfth century encouraged the growth of a body of 
professional jurists and an explosion of Roman—or Romanesque—legal 
scholarship. Legal study brought the rise of European universities and the 
development of legal science. With the other redactions ordered centuries 
earlier by Justinian, the Digest provided a central text on which legal 
interpretation could focus in much the same way the Bible did for theology; 
legal and theological hermeneutics were, in fact, closely connected for 
                                           
82 R.C. Van Caenegem, The birth of the English common law, 110 (2nd ed. 1988). 
83 P. Glenn, On common laws and The common laws of Europe and Louisiana, in Tulane Law 
Review, 1041 (79, 2005). See P. Glenn, A transnational concept of law in P. Cane and M. 
Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (2003) and Transnational common laws, in  
Fordham International Law Journal, 457 (29, 2005-6). 
84 Each would remain important to England‘s laws and legal doctrine for centuries. J.H. 
Baker, The three languages of English law, in  McGill Law Journal/Revue de Droit de McGill, 5 
(43, 1998). 
85 J. Martinez-Torrón, Anglo-American law and canon law: canonical roots of the common law 
tradition, 183 (1998). 
86 A. Kiralfy, Custom in mediaeval English law, in  Journal of Legal History, 26, 27 (9, 1988). See 
also D. Lieberman, Law/custom/tradition: perspectives from the common law, in M. Salber Phillips 
and G. Schochet (eds), Questions of tradition (2004). 
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centuries. The Concordia Discordantium Canonum (aka the Decretum, c1140), 
compiled by the monk Gratian (twelfth century), provided a comparable text 
for the study of canon law. These ‗learned laws‘ of the universities, the 
conjoined Roman and canon law as well as feudal law, stood in contrast to the 
plural folk-laws that dominated Europe legal practices throughout the 
medieval period. This revival was for some time only a scholarly movement 
with little impact on Europe‘s numerous jurisdictions. Slowly, however, those 
trained in the romano-canonical hybrid would serve as advisors, 
administrators, ambassadors, and adjudicators across Europe. As a result, they 
contributed, formally and informally, to the transplants and receptions—
doctrinal, legislative, and judicial—of the learned laws.87 They created the ius 
commune, a common body of (usually supplementary) doctrine, in contrast to 
the iura propria. Both common and local laws were important for the Western 
legal tradition. ‗Plurality was … part of the ―system,‖ and the system itself was 
inconceivable and would never have existed without the innumerable iura 
propria linked to the unity of the ius commune.‘88 
Henry II (1133-89), the French-speaking king of England and ruler of much 
of Northern France, is generally credited with establishing the writ and the 
jury, the most distinctive features of England‘s common law. But, as noted, 
there was more to English law. ‗Medieval England was graced not simply with 
a single, monolithic form of law, but several distinct types of law, sometimes 
competing, occasionally overlapping, invariably invoking different traditions, 
jurisdictions and modes of operation.‘89 Strong central courts would, it is true, 
allow it to remain comparatively insulated from continental common laws.90 
But the most important legal literature of the early common law, the so-called 
Glanvill (late twelfth century) and Bracton (c1256), both showed considerable 
Roman erudition. Canon law, too, was important to English law. Continental 
                                           
87 On the ‗Great Northward Shift‘, the ‗internal colonization‘ or diffusion of the law of the 
Mediterranean city-states above the Alps and into the European countryside, see J.Q. 
Whitman, Western legal imperialism: thinking about the deep historical roots, in  Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law, 305, 309 (10, 2009). 
88 M. Bellomo, The common legal past of Europe, 1000-1800, xiii (1995). Just as in the present, 
labelling the legal orders of the past as ‗systems‘ may exaggerate their coherence and unity. 
The law was not ‗systematic‘, but was ‘a patchwork of accommodations‘. T. Kuehn, A late 
medieval conflict of laws: inheritance by illegitimates in ius commune and ius proprium, in Law and 
History Review, 243, 271, 272 (15, 1997). 
89 A. Musson, Medieval law in context: the growth of legal consciousness from Magna Carta to the 
Peasants‘ Revolt, 9 (2001). 
90 D. Ibbetson, Common law and ius commune (2001). 
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influence may be seen in so fundamental a document as Magna Carta.91 
Sharing the same broad legal culture, English law would continue to be 
influenced by continental and canonical legal methods, maxims, courts and 
procedures, as well as specific doctrines.92 As on the continent, the legal 
education provided in the universities in England was in the learned laws. 
Around the end of the thirteenth century, however, London‘s Inns of Court 
and of Chancery provided practical vocational training in its common law. 
Taught by judge-jurists, the Inns largely focused on procedure, the writs and 
pleadings. This created additional novelty in English law. It also underscored 
the importance of doctrine in the early centuries of the English common law. 
Indeed, the ‗common learning‘ or oral doctrine of these judge-jurists had 
equivalent standing to the law reports of previous judicial decisions. As John 
Baker has written, ‗in the time of Henry VII and Henry VIII what was said as 
law in the inns was as noteworthy as what was said in court.‘93 
In general, Europe would remain a place of considerable political and legal 
diversity for centuries ‗in which hundreds of legal systems were competing.‘94 
National royal law was limited, often restricted to creating new courts rather 
than substantive law. In addition to European and nascent national common 
laws, there were a wide variety of local and customary courts that would only 
very slowly be absorbed into and altered by the former. This means first that 
unity of law in the modern sense is absent. There are different rules for 
different cities and territories and different rules for the individual 
professional groups like merchants, nobility, peasants, etc. But Pluralism of 
legal sources also means that a judge who has to decide a specific case, has to 
look for rules not only in the orders of the sovereign, but can apply rules 
which he finds in any book of authority, whether this has been expressly 
recognised by the sovereign or not. It is more important for him to find an 
                                           
91 ‗The Magna Carta was by no means a unique document.‘ R.H. Helmholz, Magna Charta 
and the ius commune, University of Chicago Law Review, 297, 363-4 (66, 1997). 
92 See, e.g., K. Pennington, Innocent until proven guilty: the origins of a legal maxim, in D. Maffei 
(ed.), A Ennio Cotese: tomo III (2001). 
93 J.H. Baker, English Law and the Renaissance, in  Cambridge Law Journal, 46, 53 (44, 1985). 
See J.H. Baker, The law‘s two bodies (2001) and The Inns of Court and legal doctrine, in J.H. Baker, 
The common law tradition: lawyers, books and the law (2000). Cf. P.G. Monateri, ―Legal doctrine‖ as 
a source of law: a transnational factor and a historical paradox, in Italian National Reports to the 
XII International Congress of comparative law (1986). 
94 D. Heirbaut, Rules for solving conflicts of law in the middle ages: part of the solution, part of the 
problem, in A. Musson, Boundaries of the law, 118 (2005). 
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appropriate rule than to be sure to confine himself to following the orders the 
sovereign has given.95 
Indeed, lawyers throughout Europe ‗applied a mixed legal system whose 
components were on the one hand local statutes and customs and on the 
other hand the law books of Justinian and the Canon Law.‘96 There was also 
the recognition of other competing and meaningful normative systems, eg 
arbitration and the internal jurisdiction of non-state corporate bodies like the 
guilds.97 
These multifarious, overlapping jurisdictions were open to the use of plural, 
often comparative, sources in adjudication. As noted, customary law—or legal 
customs—remained dominant for some time. There was little legislation. The 
open nature of adjudication meant, however, that the communis opinio of 
learned doctrine was a meaningful source of law throughout Europe. 
Romano-canonical thought was influential as a method, as a model, and as a 
subsidiary source of law.98 But this should not be exaggerated in a world of 
competing persuasive, rather than simply binding, authorities.99 A common 
European juridical culture prevailed.100 Judges and law reports were important 
throughout Europe. ‗The practice of courts was therefore a source of law on 
the Continent as in England‘.101 But such reports were seldom of much use 
anywhere for future adjudication. Especially before printing, there were few 
authentic texts of either legislation or jurisprudence. Reports also generally 
lacked an explanation of the court‘s motives or reasoning and previous 
decisions were merely persuasive rather than binding. Without the texts and 
elaborate written commentaries of the learned laws, English common lawyers 
would, over time, rely more heavily on the decisions of the courts and the law 
                                           
95 H. Coing, The Roman law as ius commune on the continent, Law Quarterly Review, 505, 513 
(89,1973). See P. Stein, The sources of law in Europe: an English perspective, in Philosophie juridique 
européenne les institutions: receuil préparé sous la direction de Jean-Marc Trigeud (1988). 
96 H. Coing, The Roman law as ius commune on the continent, in Law Quarterly Review, 505, (89, 
1973).  
97 E. Powell, Settlement of disputes by arbitration in fifteenth-century England, in  Law and History 
Review, 21 (2, 1984). 
98 D.J. Ibbetson and A.D.E. Lewis, The Roman law tradition, in D.J. Ibbetson and A.D.E. 
Lewis (eds), The Roman law tradition, 3-4 (1994).  
99 See generally Glenn, Persuasive authority. 
100 L. Moccia, Historical overview on the origins and attitudes of comparative law, in B. de Witte and 
C. Forder (eds), The common law of Europe and the future of legal education, 611 (1992). 
101 J.H. Baker, Case-law in England and continental Europe, in J.H. Baker, The common law 
tradition, 108 (2000). See J.H. Baker, Preface and Records, reports and the origins of case-law in 
England, in J.H. Baker (ed), Judicial records, law reports, and the growth of case law, 6 (1989). 
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reports they generated.102 And in England, as in other parts of Europe, there 
continued ‗the pretence that law was still fundamentally customary‘.103  
Only very slowly would this plurality of laws give way to common national 
laws. As noted, there were numerous competing jurisdictions within England. 
The rigidity of the common law led to the creation, in the fifteenth century, of 
the ‗Equity‘ courts. Originally staffed by clerics trained in the learned laws, the 
substance and procedure of Chancery showed Romano-canonical sources. 
They would create a separate but important law common to England. 
Numerous other courts arose out of the king‘s prerogative powers: Admiralty, 
Constable and Marshall, Chivalry, Requests, the University Courts, and Star 
Chamber. Indeed, ‗[c]ommon lawyers seem to have regarded canon law and 
civil law as comparable bodies of law maintained and passed down by their 
counterpart professions in much the same way.‘104 Many of these jurisdictions 
ensured that Anglophone lawyers were in constant communication with 
continental legal developments.105 Over time, however, rivalry developed 
between common lawyers on the one hand and Equity and the Anglo-
‗civilians‘ on the other. There were also England‘s numerous iura propria, its 
commercial, urban, manorial, sessions of the justices of the peace or sheriffs, 
small-claim ‗courts of requests‘, and other local jurisdictions. There were still 
other numerous, lesser, summary sites of ‗low justice‘ where formal law meant 
little and much was left to the discretion of lay judges. Here especially, 
competing normative traditions could easily trespass on the ephemeral 
decisions and equitable motivations of the courts.  
V. TOWARDS LEGAL UNITY 
Significant changes in the state, and consequently the law, occurred between 
the fifteenth- and seventeenth-centuries. Reception, redaction, and religious 
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Reformation were vital to the creation of legal and political centralism across 
Europe. The ius commune, could promote a more unitary law against local and 
regional custom.106  It provided a sophisticated, ready model for reception, 
whether piecemeal or wholesale. Similarly, redactions or ‗codifications‘ of 
custom, giving control to jurists and judges, reduced, to a degree, the complex 
diversity of custom. As such, they were a step towards regional and national 
common laws through a sort of quasi-legislative act. In France, this occurred 
‗by preserving the main elements of the customary systems and by supplying a 
more tractable material for the skilled legal technicians of the intervening 
centuries.‘107 By eliminating links to the Roman church, the Reformation also 
considerably enhanced the power of monarchy and strengthened the concept 
of state sovereignty, serving as a model for both state absolutism and legal 
positivism.108 In more practical terms, it led over time, and assisted by the 
demands of colonial expansion, to a greater concentration of political power. 
It contributed, both practically and philosophically, to an emphasis on law-
making and, more indirectly, to the recognition of nation-states after the 
confessional wars of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries and to the 
elaboration of a more complex ‗law of nations‘. Both external and internal 
sovereignty began to shift to the metropolitan centre.109 This accelerated the 
movement from ‗[m]ulticentric legal orders – those in which the state is one 
among many legal authorities‘ to ‗state-centered legal orders in which the state 
has at least made, if not sustained, a claim to dominance over other legal 
authorities.‘110 
There were also significant seventeenth-century developments influencing 
legal practice and legal sources. Changes in natural law theory and the 
contemporaneous growth of ‗institutional‘ writings—based on the simple, 
comprehensive student-oriented structure of Justinian‘s Institutes—were both 
important.111 The ‗modern natural law‘ of the period was, or appeared to its 
advocates to be, less reliant on revelation and unconnected to one faith. Many 
                                           
106 C.C. Turpin, The reception of Roman law, in Irish Jurist, 162 (1968).   
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suggested the possibility of constructing a rational system of law on the basis 
of deduction. This was linked to, among other things, changes in the natural 
sciences, especially the rejection of Aristotelianism, and theological positivism. 
It suggested, in effect, that natural law could be redacted—or transformed—
into positive law. The learned laws, as ‗written reason‘, frequently provided 
the substance of these ideal laws that, in turn, served as model codes for state 
laws. This dovetailed with the development of ‗institutional‘ writings. These 
were generally written in the vernacular and were frequently used to rationalise 
or harmonise existing laws. They were, in effect, selective digests of existing 
laws, usually lacking the force of law. They were also important models. 
Throughout Europe and America, both seventeenth-century natural law and 
institutional writings provided a standard by which laws could be reformed 
and unified and a common law extended.112 Both made possible university 
education, again in the vernacular, of the burgeoning national laws. At once, 
they also weakened the ius commune and prepared the way for later national 
codifications.  
With the growth of state power, the expansion of national common laws 
continued with, as Antonio Padoa-Schioppa put it, ‗a progressive 
appropriation by the state of the task of administering the law in its various 
manifestations.‘113 This was true again of Britain and Ireland.114 English law 
displaced Welsh law in the sixteenth century and Irish Brehon law in the next. 
Scotland, long independent and drawing heavily on the ius commune, united 
with England first through their respective crowns (1605) and later their 
respective parliaments (1707). While distinct, Scottish laws would increasingly 
come under the influence of English laws.115 Within England, Wales, and 
Ireland, the relationship between common lawyers on the one hand and 
prerogative lawyers and the Anglo-civilians, on the other, deteriorated in the 
seventeenth century.116 The internal hegemony of common lawyers was 
confirmed in significant part by their association with the rise of parliamentary 
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power. Throughout the century, the English common law began to accelerate 
its limitations on, or absorption of, other jurisdictions. The procedural and 
substantive laws of the courts of common law and Equity converged. At 
century‘s end, England had taken important steps towards the establishment 
of a limited, constitutional monarchy. Legal hybridity persisted, however, both 
in Europe and in its colonies. ‗Jurisdictional jockeying‘ was important for 
both.117 In Britain‘s colonies, various English laws, colonial charters, and 
simplified legal codes based on scripture were all important before the 
reception—again doctrinal, judicial, and legislative—of the English common 
law over the course of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries. 
The move towards legal unity, towards monism and centralism, continued in 
the eighteenth century alongside increasing criticism of legal inequality and 
restraints, of crown interference, and of religious influence and intolerance. In 
law, this more enlightened view meant a pan-European effort to teach the 
national common laws in the universities and usually in the vernacular. In 
England, William Blackstone‘s lectures and Commentaries on the laws of England 
(1765-9), both doctrine, borrowed from the ‗institutional‘ form and served a 
code-like function.118 Throughout Europe there was a shift towards legislation, 
to clearer and more systematic law, and to reforms in criminal law. The 
progressive formalisation of law satisfied in some measure a more general 
demand for greater levels of equality before the law and for clearer laws that 
might promote both political stability and economic growth. On the 
continent, there were early codes or restatements of the maturing common 
laws. Growing out of natural law and institutional writings, these provided a 
more unitary digest of the law, though without abrogating existing laws. 119 The 
mediating institutions of the old regimes and its myriad, hybrid jurisdictions 
were slowly giving way. As Tamanaha has written, Customary norms and 
religious law were, in effect, banished to the private realm. They did not 
                                           
117 L. Benton, Making order out of trouble: jurisdictional politics in the Spanish colonial borderlands, in  
Law and Social Inquiry, 373, 375 (26, 2001). See generally L. Benton, Law and colonial 
cultures. See also P. Karsten, Between law and custom: ‗high‘ and ‗low‘ legal cultures in the lands of the 
British diaspora-the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 1600-1900 (2002). 
118 J.W. Cairns, Blackstone: an English institutist: legal literature and the rise of the nation state, in 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 318 (4, 1984) and A. Watson, The structure of Blackstone‘s 
Commentaries, in Yale Law Journal 795 (97, 1988). See also S. Donlan, ―The places most fit for 
this purpose‖: Francis Stoughton Sullivan and legal study at the University of Dublin (1761-6), in  
Eighteenth-Century Ireland/Iris an dá chultúr, 140 (18, 2005). 
119 D. Lieberman, Codification, consolidation and parliamentary statute, in J. Brewer and E. 
Hellmuth (eds), Rethinking Leviathan: the eighteenth-century state in Britain and Germany (1999). 
 
Seán Patrick Donlan 
‗Remembering: Legal Hybridity and Legal History‘ 
 
25 
disappear, but a transformation in their status cam about. Some of these 
norms and institutions continued to obtain recognition and sanction from 
state legal systems; other norms continued to be observed and enforced in 
strictly social or religious contexts. The key characteristic they lost over time 
was their former, equal standing and autonomous legal status. Once 
considered independently applicable bodies of law, owing to the takeover of 
state law they rather became norms, still socially influential, but now carrying a 
different status from that of official state law.120 
Alongside this state legalism, considerable hybridity remained, the ‗often 
contradictory systems of normative ordering‘ and judicial discretion that 
intruded on legal rules.121 But normative pluralism, or rather its recognition by 
political and legal authorities, was being transformed. 
The movement towards legal unity and centralisation quickened with the 
revolutions which rocked the intellectual and institutional foundations of 
Europe‘s ancien régimes in the aftermath of the revolution in France. The plurality 
of laws that had characterised Europe for centuries was largely eliminated: 
The earlier dialectics without synthesis, the on-going interpretative process 
and co-existence of the ius commune and ius proprium in its many forms, was 
superseded by purely national legal systems that did not acknowledge any 
competitors. The idea of unlimited state sovereignty did not allow for the 
pluralistic and fragmented interplay of various legal orders within the borders 
of a state…. All law was now state law ….122 
The focus on legal positivism, on law-making and legal clarity, was linked to 
both the new powers of the state and demands for popular accountability. In 
continental law, this was expressed in legislation, often codal, and 
subsequently in exegetical interpretation.123 Many nineteenth-century codes 
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were attempts to create a set of laws that was authoritative, comprehensive, 
systematic, and internally harmonious. They were intended to abrogate 
previous or conflicting law and to unify the legal system into a national 
common law. While reflecting the laws of the ancien régime, both Roman and 
Germanic in origin, this movement was exemplified in the Code Civil (1804).124 
Modern nationalism and codification marked an important change from 
Europe‘s plural, juridical culture. It was a shift from European iura communia 
and local iura propria to national law, from persuasive to binding authorities, 
from open to closed legal systems, and from judges and jurists to legislators.125 
Suggesting Maine‘s famous distinction, it has been noted that ‗the famous 
historical shift from status to contract was accompanied by an equally 
significant shift from status to locus.‘126 
Nineteenth-century Anglo-American positivism, exemplified by Jeremy 
Bentham and John Austin, echoed the concern for legal uniformity and 
clarity. It was linked to British parliamentary supremacy and the rise of statute 
law. It can also be seen in the hardening of precedent into stare decisis, where a 
single judicial decision is binding, rather than merely persuasive, on the basis 
of the court‘s authority alone.127 Legal education and law reporting improved, 
often with official reporters. A clearer appellate hierarchy of courts was 
established with, by mid-century, professional law lords at their head. The writ 
system was relaxed in favour of general pleading, bringing a new focus on 
substantive, rather than procedural, law. Finally, along with the political union 
of Britain and Ireland, the common law and equity were fused and England‘s 
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multifarious jurisdictions were enveloped by the courts of common law.128 
This brought a new focus on substantive, rather than procedural, law, and an 
attempt to limit judicial subjectivity.129 If this did not entirely eliminate, in fact, 
either legal or normative hybridity, ‗[b]y the end of the nineteenth century law 
can hardly be thought of except in its formal or professional sense.‘130 
American reforms mirrored these, though primarily at the level of the states 
rather than the national government. In contrast to Britain, the United States 
also saw the development of a more significant and rationalised textbook 
tradition and more meaningful legal education in the universities.131 If this 
served to undermine the need for extensive codification, American lawyers 
were also more receptive to modest codification than were their English 
counterparts.132 Codes of procedure were especially common throughout the 
states, but private law codification also occurred. 
VI. A BRIEF ASIDE ON MODERN ‗MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS‘ 
This brief jaunt through comparative legal history is offered as a reminder of 
the hybridity of the past and to better prepare jurists for the pluralism of the 
present. Even in the West, a unified system of national state law is the 
historical exception, the product of complex historical developments. This 
overview points to the importance of legal history to comparative law. Each is 
closely connected: ‗[t]he step in this direction—towards the study of the past 
as another country—entails the same exit and return to the familiar landscape 
of contemporary law that comparativists experience when they approach 
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contemporary legal systems.‘133 Meaningful comparative legal history is, 
however, rare.134 Admittedly, it is ‗exceedingly difficult to do‘. 135 But genuine 
comparative legal history offers the possibility of escaping simplistic 
genealogies of national and pan-European legal history, including crude 
accounts of the reception of the ius commune. It provides a wider context for 
legal ideas and institutions and is, as a result, valuable both to legal practice 
and legal theory. The survey of Western legal history presented here also 
suggests the utility of more elaborate ‗histories of hybridity‘, detailed histories 
of the pluralisms of the Western past.136 Followed across time, these 
histories—either ‗internal‘ or ‗external‘—would provide a unique perspective 
on the move from (i) an unstructured, strong hybridity to a (ii) structured, 
weak mix under the ultimate authority (at least in theory) of the state to (iii) 
genuine national common laws.137 Ideally, these accounts would also include 
the study of other normative systems. Histories of both ‗law in action‘ and 
‗living law‘ would be very valuable.138 Given their subject, they would be 
inherently comparative, requiring significant historical-cultural immersion. 
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The overview offered here should also allow, or perhaps require, us to better 
contextualise modern legal traditions identified as ‗mixed legal systems‘.139 
These need not be ‗reduced‘, as Luigi Moccia put it, by crude taxonomies ‗into 
a marginal and uncertain position‘.140 Mixity is instead ‗the rule.‘141 Modern 
hybrid systems are simply the most explicitly and obviously mixed.142 Indeed, 
the ‗concept‘ of a mixed system is, as Glenn has suggested, ‗very recent‘, 
dependent on the nationalism, monism, centralism, and positivism of the past 
two centuries.143 This is the ‗hidden temporal dimension‘ in the categorisation 
of mixed systems.144 The uniqueness of mixed jurisdictions is thus no longer 
the fact of their hybridity, but their particular mix and character.145 The 
absence of ‗pure‘ legal traditions also goes some way towards explaining the 
‗perilous and delicate task‘ involved in scholarship on mixity.146 Ignazio 
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Castellucci has, for example, noted the difficulty in determining how mixed a 
system must be to qualify as such: 
Some balance is needed, for classifications to be useful at all. A classification 
which is too fine is not so useful … A classification which is too coarse and 
general is not so either, as its categories will be broader than appropriate to 
convey the desirable amount of information.147 
Modern mixes include both European and more exotic hybrids. Most of these 
are outside of Europe, the result of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
colonialism and subsequent Anglo-American political and military 
hegemony.148 Most often discussed by comparatists are the ‗classical mixed 
jurisdictions‘ combining Anglo-American public and criminal law with 
continental private law in reasonably discreet sections. The numerous non-
European hybrids vary considerably. 149 Where the mix includes European law, 
local laws may persist, but Western traditions are often dominant in a weak, 
state legal pluralism.150 The non-European laws in these systems might 
themselves be linked to other transnational bodies of law such as the Hindu 
or Islamic legal traditions. And, just as with the transplantation of the modern 
state, the reception of Western law may be imperfect beyond Europe.151 As 
noted, anthropologists have endeavoured to examine the persistence of 
normative pluralism or strong legal pluralism in which laws and norms 
coexist, both in the West and beyond. Comparatists have done so less often. 
Given their explicit experiences with legal hybridity, mixed jurists may be 
particularly well-placed to pursue research on both legal and normative 
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hybridity, past and present and around the globe. Some are already engaged in 
this research. Patrick Glenn has been especially forceful in pointing out the 
significant limits to, and distortions created by, assigning legal orders to more-
or-less discrete and closed legal families.152 His insistence on speaking of legal 
‗traditions‘—rather than ‗systems‘—is meant, among other things, to draw 
attention to the historically dynamic nature of legal orders. And unlike a closed 
legal ‗system‘, legal ‗traditions‘ are acknowledged to have been—and to 
remain—open to and inclusive of non-state norms.153 This is, for him, both 
merely descriptive as well as usefully prescriptive: 
The concept of legal tradition thus allows comparative appreciation of laws of 
the world which are non-systematic in character. They need not be filtered 
through state systems in order to be included in a taxonomic process of 
categorization, but may be appreciated as normative information with their 
own criteria for human grouping.154 
This acknowledgement of normative pluralism is rooted in Glenn‘s 
considerable historical and comparative nous. He has written extensively on 
the complexity of Europe‘s plural and often transnational common laws.155 
This historical analysis is an essential component of his ‗normative legal 
history‘, the critique of legal nationalism, centralism and positivism.156 Drawing 
on this research and his experience in a mixed system, Glenn has also 
criticised the canard of legal incommensurability, arguing that ‗the dialogue of 
mixed jurisdictions is proof to the contrary‘.157 
                                           
152 P. Glenn, Legal traditions of the world (4th ed. 2010). Cf. N.H.D. Foster (ed), A fresh start for 
comparative legal studies: a collective review of Patrick Glenn‘s Legal traditions of the world, 2nd edition, in 
Journal of Comparative Law, 100 (1, 2006). 
153 P. Glenn, A concept of legal tradition, in Queen‘s Law Journal, 427, 438-40 (34, 2009). Cf. J. 
Merryman and R. Pérez-Perdomo, The civil law tradition: an introduction to the legal systems of 
Europe and Latin America 1, 2 (3rd ed. 2007) and J. Merryman, On the convergence (and divergence) 
of the civil law and the common law, in Stanford Journal of International Law, 357, especially 
379-85 (17, 1981). 
154 P. Glenn, Comparative legal families and comparative legal traditions, in M. Reimann and R. 
Zimmermann, The Oxford handbook of comparative law, 433, 436. 
155 P. Glenn, The national law tradition, in Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (11, 2007, 
available at www.ejcl.org/113/abs113-1.html (last visited 30 November 2010), section 1.1. 
See P. Glenn, A transnational concept of law, in P. Cane and M. Tushnet, The Oxford handbook of 
legal studies and P. Glenn, Transnational common laws, in Fordham International Law Journal, 
457 (29, 2005-6). 
156 P. Glenn, On common laws, viii. 
157 P. Glenn, Mixing it up, in Tulane Law Review, 79 (78, 2003). See also P. Glenn, Are legal 
traditions incommensurable, in American Journal of Comparative Law, 133 (49, 2001). See also 
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A Louisianian, Vernon Palmer has written extensively on the ‗classical mixed 
jurisdictions‘, arguing that a number of these jurisdictions—Israel, Louisiana, 
the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Quebec, Scotland, and South Africa—make up a 
‗third legal family‘ in specific combinations of continental private law with 
Anglo-American public and criminal law.158 These, he argues, have ‗profound 
generalizable resemblances‘.159 In his work and with the creation of the World 
Society of Mixed Jurisdiction Jurists, of which he is President, Palmer has been 
instrumental in encouraging scholarship in and communication between these 
jurisdictions.160 If his focus is largely on the ‗third legal family‘, he is also an 
historian and a comparatist with experience in African law.161 Focusing largely 
on legal rather than normative hybridity, he has written about the ‗myth of 
                                                                                                                           
D. Visser, Cultural forces in the making of mixed legal systems, 76. Cf. P. Legrand, The impossibility 
of legal transplants and European legal systems are not converging. 
158 V. Palmer, Mixed jurisdictions worldwide. See V. Palmer, Mixed jurisdictions, in Smits, Elgar 
encyclopedia of comparative law and Palmer‘s most recent summary, Quebec and her sisters in the 
Third Legal Family, 54 McGill Law Journal//Revue de Droit de McGill 321, 343-4 (2009). 
Note that Palmer‘s inclusion of public law is especially useful in moving away from 
comparative law‘s traditional narrow focus on private law. Palmer., Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide, 6n8. See also. Örücü, Public law in mixed legal systems and public law as a ―mixed 
system‖, in 5 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (2001, available at www.ejcl.org/ 
52/abs52-2.html (last visited 30 November 2010). 
159 Palmer, Mixed jurisdictions worldwide, 4. Included in Appendix B of Mixed jurisdictions 
worldwide is a list of additional jurisdictions: Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Saint Lucia, the 
Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, and Sri Lanka. 
160 See, most recently, Palmer and E Reid (eds), Mixed jurisdictions compared: the private law of 
Louisiana and Scotland (2009). 
161 See, e.g., over the past decade: Insularity and leadership in American comparative law: the past 
one hundred years, in 75 Tulane Law Review 1093 (2001); The French connection and the Spanish 
perception: historical debates and contemporary evaluation of French influence on Louisiana civil law, in 63 
Louisiana Law Review 1067 (2003); The recent discovery of Moreau Lislet‘s system of omissions and 
its importance to the debate over the source of the Digest of 1808, in 49 Loyola Law Review 301 
(2003); The Louisiana civilian experience: critiques of codification in a mixed jurisdiction (2005); From 
Lerotholi to Lando: some examples of comparative law methodology, in 53 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 261 (2005); The customs of slavery: the war without arms, in 48 American 
Journal of Legal History 177 (2006); Historical notes on the first codes and institutions in French 
Louisiana, in O. Moretéau, J. Romanch, Jr, and A.L. Zuppi (eds), Essays in honor of Saul 
Litvinoff (2008); Strange science of codifying slavery: Moreau Lislet and the Louisiana Digest of 1808, in 
24 Tulane European & Civil Law Forum 83 (2009). See also Palmer and S.M. Poulter, The 
Legal System of Lesotho (1972). 
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pure laws‘, noting that ‗we live in a predominantly mixed and plural world.‘162 
Indeed, he has even acknowledged the value of pluralism to research on 
mixed systems: 
To legal anthropologists and legal pluralists, the principal criterion of a mixed 
system is simply the presence or interaction of two or more kinds of laws or 
legal traditions with the same social field. The mixed nature of a legal order 
can be discovered and confirmed in an objective manner by research and 
observation. Any interaction between laws of a different type or source—
indigenous with received, religious with customary, Western with non-
Western—is sufficient to constitute a mixed legal system….163 
Palmer has also argued, however, that there are significant limitations to this 
approach. ‗Pluralism‘, he writes, ‗has yet to present a taxonomy that 
differentiates and arranges the hybrids into useful groupings.‘164 If he 
questions whether pluralism has shown how to do this ‗in a rational and 
coherent way‘, he also suggests that ‗it will be accomplished by a mixed 
jurisdiction jurist.‘165 
Esin Örücü has contributed both general and more-narrowly targeted research 
on legal hybridity. Her writings, perhaps especially her ‗Mixed and mixing 
systems: a conceptual search‘, may be the most sophisticated general analyses 
of the plurality of laws in mixed systems.166 A native of Turkey, she has argued 
for an ‗expansion‘ of research beyond the ‗classical mixed jurisdictions‘ to 
more exotic hybrids.167 A noted comparatist, Örücü has also been especially 
critical of the traditional legal families of comparative law.168 Instead, she has 
                                           
162 Palmer, Mixed legal systems … and the myth of pure laws, 1207 (italics in original). ‗A useful 
classification scheme ought to begin with their centrality as a point of departure.‘ Ibid., 
1211. 
163 Palmer, Quebec and her sisters in the Third Legal Family, 333. 
164 Ibid., 335.  
165 Palmer, Two rival theories of mixed legal systems, 30, 30. 
166 See especially Örücü, Mixed and mixing systems: a conceptual search, in Örücü, Attwooll, and 
Coyle, Studies in legal systems.  
167 Örücü, What is a mixed legal system: exclusion or expansion?, in Örücü, Mixed legal systems at 
new frontiers. Note that this earlier versions of this latter article can be found in Örücü (ed), 3 
Journal of Comparative Law (2008) and in 12 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 
(2008) at www.ejcl.org/121/abs121-15.html (last visited 30 November 2010). Cf. 
Castellucci, How mixed must a mixed system be? On Turkey, see, e.g., Örücü, Turkey‘s synthetic 
legal system and her indigenous soci-cultural(s) in a ―covert‖ mix, in Örücü, Mixed legal systems at new 
frontiers. 
168 Örücü, A general view of ―legal families‖ and of ―mixing systems, in Örücü and Nelken, 
Comparative law, 177. See, e.g., Örücü, Critical comparative law (1999, also available in 4 
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proposed a ‗family trees‘ model that ‗regards all legal systems as mixed and 
overlapping, overtly or covertly, and groups them according to the 
proportionate mixture of the ingredients.‘169 Indeed, she has argued that not 
only mixed traditions, but other ‗extraordinary places‘ may be of great use to 
comparative law.170 In her work, Örücü has also employed an especially 
colourful vocabulary and useful models. She has used, for example, culinary 
terms—from ‗mixing bowls‘ to ‗purees‘—to describe the ways in which laws 
might mix.171 She has also written about the diffusion of law.172 ‗Mixed and 
mixing systems and the migration of legal institutions‘, she writes, ‗are two 
inseparable fields of study. The fact that law is not static lies at the bottom of 
all mixed systems.‘173 Finally, Örücü has encouraged engagement with ‗legal 
pluralisms, in order to appreciate the relationship between official state law 
and religious and customary laws, not only as anthropologists but as 
comparative lawyers.‘174 As a whole, she has provided important elements for a 
research project that might build on the work of Glenn and answer Palmer‘s 
pluralist challenge. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
‗Remembering‘ the ‗lost memory‘ of our past hybridity has significant 
implications for comparative law as well as for legal philosophy more 
generally. Most obviously, it undermines the conjoined ideas of legal 
                                                                                                                           
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law (2000) at www.ejcl.org/41/abs41-1.html (last 
visited 30 November 2010); The enigma of comparative law: variations on a theme for the twenty-first 
century (2004); Looking at convergence through the eyes of a comparative lawyer, in 9 Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law (2005, available at www.ejcl.org/92/art92-1.html (last visited 
30 November 2010)). 
169 Örücü, Family trees for legal systems: towards a contemporary approach, in van Hoecke, 
Epistemology and methodology of comparative law, 363. 
170 Örücü, Comparatists and extraordinary places, in Legrand and Munday, Comparative legal 
studies. 
171 See Örücü, Developing comparative law, in Örücü and Nelken, Comparative law, 180. See 
Örücü, A theoretical framework for transfrontier mobility of law, in Jagtenberg, Örücü, and de Roo, 
Transfrontier mobility of law, 10-12. 
172 Örücü, A theoretical framework for transfrontier mobility of law, in Jagtenberg, Örücü, and de 
Roo, Transfrontier mobility of law and Law as transposition.  
173 Örücü, Mixed and mixing systems: a conceptual search, 341. 
174 Örücü, General introduction: mixed legal systems at new frontiers, in Örücü, Mixed legal systems at 
new frontiers, 7. See Örücü, Mixed and mixing systems: a conceptual search, 342, 350-1 and 
Developing comparative law in Örücü and Nelken, Comparative law, 61. 
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nationalism, monism, centralism, and positivism spawned by nineteenth-
century shifts in social and intellectual history. It reminds us that the ‗state‘ 
has been historically, and in much of the world remains, only the most 
obvious and formal creator of norms. In place of forcing plural and dynamic 
traditions into discrete, closed legal families or systems, the complexity of 
Western legal history suggests a new, admittedly complex and challenging, 
study of hybridity and diffusion. I have tried to suggest how social scientists 
and jurisprudes, comparatists and legal historians, have given us the resources 
to pursue this project. Comparative legal history is especially important here, 
not least in allowing us to better understand and contextualize contemporary 
mixed legal systems. As Palmer has written, 
Recognizing that hybridity is a universal fact will no doubt require us to revise 
some of the received attitudes and prejudices about mixed systems, 
particularly attitudes about ‗classical‘ mixed jurisdictions such as Louisiana …. 
[M]ixed systems have been too much at the center of legal evolution to be 
regarded as something unusual or strange. They cannot be both paradigms 
and pariahs at the same time. A useful classification scheme ought to begin 
with their centrality as a point of departure. That would force us to abandon 
the conceit that ‗pure‘ legal systems are somehow privileged or preferred, that 
some mixtures are superior to other mixtures, or that the utility of mixed 
systems lies in the incidental lessons or insights they may have for their 
parents.175 
Mixed jurists like Palmer, Glenn, and Örücü have already contributed much to 
studies of hybridity and diffusion, past and present and around the globe. 
Comparativists and legal historians have, in an engaged, expanded 
interdisciplinary dialogue, much more to offer. 
 
 
 
                                           
175 Palmer, Mixed legal systems … and the myth of pure laws, 1210-1211. 
